Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 56
Issue 2 Volume 56, Issue 2 (Winter 2019)

Article 6

5-21-2020

Re-Charting the Remedial Course for Section 11(b) Violations
Post-Jordan
Andrew Pilla
Scarborough Crown Attorney’s Office, Ministry of Attorney General for Ontario

Levi Vandersteen
Scarborough Crown Attorney’s Office, Ministry of Attorney General for Ontario

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons

Article

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative
Works 4.0 License.
Citation Information
Pilla, Andrew and Vandersteen, Levi. "Re-Charting the Remedial Course for Section 11(b) Violations PostJordan." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 56.2 (2019) : 436-461.
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol56/iss2/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Osgoode Hall Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.

Re-Charting the Remedial Course for Section 11(b) Violations Post-Jordan
Abstract
In R v Jordan, the Supreme Court of Canada adopted a new framework for establishing violations of the
right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter. It did not, however, adopt a
new approach to the remedy applicable thereafter. Since the 1987 decision R v Rahey, the only remedy for
unreasonable delay has been a stay of proceedings. This article contends that this “automatic stay rule”
must be revisited post-Jordan. It does so by conceptualizing Jordan as a shift from an “interest
balancing” framework—where individual and societal interests are weighed against one another—to a
calculus largely devoid of interest balancing. The first section of this article contends that, while this shift
promises a host of practical benefits, the dearth of any interest balancing under either Jordan or Rahey
results in a reductive section 11(b) regime, which ignores case-by-case variations in factors that are
plainly relevant to whether a given prosecution ought to be stayed. The second section of this article
surveys existing interest balancing remedial frameworks under the Charter, arguing that the interests
removed in Jordan are otherwise considered to be, and ought to be re-introduced as, remedial factors.
The third section addresses the practical effects of the automatic stay rule on Canadian society, accused
persons, and section 11(b) jurisprudence itself. The fourth proposes that the rationale for the automatic
stay rule is both problematic and obsolete, necessitating the adoption of a “corrective justice” approach
to section 11(b) violations. The paper concludes by outlining how the ideal remedial framework would
function.
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In R v Jordan, the Supreme Court of Canada adopted a new framework for establishing
violations of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter.
It did not, however, adopt a new approach to the remedy applicable thereafter. Since the 1987
decision R v Rahey, the only remedy for unreasonable delay has been a stay of proceedings.
This article contends that this “automatic stay rule” must be revisited post-Jordan. It does
so by conceptualizing Jordan as a shift from an “interest balancing” framework—where
individual and societal interests are weighed against one another—to a calculus largely
devoid of interest balancing. The first section of this article contends that, while this shift
promises a host of practical benefits, the dearth of any interest balancing under either Jordan
*
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or Rahey results in a reductive section 11(b) regime, which ignores case-by-case variations
in factors that are plainly relevant to whether a given prosecution ought to be stayed. The
second section of this article surveys existing interest balancing remedial frameworks under
the Charter, arguing that the interests removed in Jordan are otherwise considered to be,
and ought to be re-introduced as, remedial factors. The third section addresses the practical
effects of the automatic stay rule on Canadian society, accused persons, and section 11(b)
jurisprudence itself. The fourth proposes that the rationale for the automatic stay rule is both
problematic and obsolete, necessitating the adoption of a “corrective justice” approach to
section 11(b) violations. The paper concludes by outlining how the ideal remedial framework
would function.

IN R V JORDAN, the Supreme Court of Canada “embark[ed] … on uncharted
waters” for the second time in twenty-fve years by crafting a new framework for
establishing unreasonable delay in criminal proceedings under section 11(b) of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.1 Te majority ruled that “the system
ha[d] lost its way” under the preceding R v Morin framework, perpetuating a
pervasive “culture of complacency towards delay” in the administration of justice.2
In an intrepid efort to correct the section 11(b) course, the majority changed tack
from the fexible Morin framework to one predicated on a simplifed calculus.3
Te majority suggestively noted, however, that it had not been invited to rethink
the Court’s approach to remedy, which it charted in the 1987 decision Rahey v
R, where three concurring decisions held that the only remedy for a violation
of section 11(b) is a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Charter (the
“automatic stay rule”).4 Tis article proposes that Jordan is merely the frst step
in correcting the section 11(b) course. Canadian courts must now revisit the
automatic stay rule.
Part I of this article introduces the concept of “interest balancing,”
where individual and societal interests are weighed against one another in the

1.

2.
3.
4.

Justice Cromwell cites Justice Sopinka in R v Morin: “Embarking as we did on unchartered
waters it is not surprising that the course we steered has required, and may require in the
future, some alteration in its direction to accord with experience.” [1992] 1 SCR 771 at 784
[Morin] cited in R v Jordan, 2016 SCC 27 at para 145 [Jordan]. See also R v Askov, [1990] 2
SCR 1199 [Askov].
Jordan, supra note 1 at paras 29, 40.
Ibid at paras 38, 45-46, 77-81, 92-104.
Ibid at para 35. See also R v Rahey, [1987] 1 SCR 588 [Rahey]. See especially R v Mills,
in which the majority of the Court appears to have ruled that alternative remedies were
available. [1986] 1 SCR 863 [Mills]. To date, the Court has declined to re-open the issue of
remedy. See Morin, supra note 1 809.
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determination of an appropriate remedy.5 By largely removing interest balancing
from the section 11(b) analysis, the simplifed Jordan framework presents a real
promise of faster trials more frequently; however, the paucity of interest balancing
under either Jordan or Rahey results in a reductive section 11(b) regime. Part
II surveys existing interest balancing remedial frameworks, demonstrating that
the factors excised from the section 11(b) analysis in Jordan are frequently
considered relevant to the determination of an appropriate remedy for violations
of the Charter’s other legal rights. Part III addresses the practical efects of the
automatic stay rule on Canadian society, accused persons, and section 11(b)
jurisprudence itself. Part IV proposes that the rationale for the automatic stay
rule is both problematic and obsolete, necessitating the adoption of a “corrective
justice” approach to section 11(b) violations. Part V outlines how such a remedial
framework should function and briefy discusses the ancillary benefts of this
proposed regime.

I. THE COURSE PARTIALLY CORRECTED: THE REMOVAL OF
INTEREST BALANCING CONSIDERATIONS IN JORDAN
In the Jordan majority’s view, the transition from the fexible Morin framework to
one predicated on a simplifed calculus was pragmatically necessary to remedy the
“doctrinal and practical difculties plaguing the analytical framework.”6 Under
Morin, trial judges balanced several factors in the determination of whether the
delay in a given case was reasonable: “the length of the delay,” “waiver of any time
periods,” “the reasons for the delay,” and “any prejudice to the accused.”7 While
temporal “guidelines” developed, they were more complicated to calculate and
compliance was merely one factor in a sweeping balancing analysis. Owing in
part to this over-inclusion of conceptually distinct factors, the Jordan majority
found that the Morin framework was “unpredictable,” “highly subjective,”
5.

Te term “interest balancing” was conceived of by Paul Gerwitz:
Under the approach I shall call ‘Interest Balancing,’ remedial efectiveness for victims is only
one of the factors in choosing a remedy; other social interests are also relevant and may justify
some sacrifce of achievable remedial efectiveness. In evaluating a remedy, courts in some sense
‘balance’ its net remedial benefts to victims against the net costs it imposes on a broader range
of social interests.

6.
7.

Paul Gerwitz, “Remedies and Resistance” (1983) 92 Yale LJ 585 at 591. See also Sonja
B Starr, “Rethinking ‘Efective Remedies’: Remedial Deterrence in International Courts”
(2008) 83 NYU L Rev 693. An interest balancing approach “permit[s] courts to justify
remedial shortfall based on other interests beyond those of the plaintifs” (ibid at 753).
R v Cody, 2017 SCC 31 at para 1 [Cody].
Supra note 1 at para 31.
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“unduly complex,” and ultimately failed to “achieve future compliance with
consistent standards.”8
By addressing these doctrinal and practical difculties, the Jordan framework
presents a real promise of faster trials more frequently. Implementing a simplifed
and defnitive calculus allowed the majority to set concrete deadlines for
the administration of justice and instil a degree of objectivity lacking under
Morin—developments which the majority believed will increase “confdence in
the administration of justice.”9 Te ability to foresee whether a section 11(b)
issue is likely to arise at the pretrial phase through reference to the applicable
Jordan ceiling has enabled justice system participants to streamline scheduling
procedures and target problem cases. Te presumption of (un)reasonableness that
hinges upon compliance with those ceilings allowed the majority to implement
“constructive incentives” designed to ensure proactivity on the part of both the
Crown and defence.10 In R v Cody, the Supreme Court unanimously emphasized
the “important role trial judges play” post-Jordan “in curtailing unnecessary delay
and changing courtroom culture,” encouraging them to manage cases actively and
summarily dismiss frivolous applications.11 Finally, the Jordan decision itself led to
increased public and governmental attention to existing delay issues, contributing
to an increase in resources for the administration of justice.12 Cumulatively, these
developments appear to have begun the difcult work of combatting the culture
of complacency towards delay condemned by the majority.
8.

Jordan, supra note 1 at paras 31-45. Even the dissent, which would have upheld the Morin
framework, agreed “that the way in which Morin ha[d] come to be applied is unduly
complicated” (ibid at para 158).
9. Jordan, supra note 1 at para 55.
10. Ibid at para 51. Tere are three incentives. First, when the presumptive ceiling has been
exceeded and the Crown seeks to rely on discrete events, it bears the onus of demonstrating
that it took “reasonable available steps to avoid and address the problem before the delay
exceeded the ceiling.” Ibid at para 70; Cody, supra note 6 at paras 48-62. Second, under the
“particularly complex case” exception, the Crown must demonstrate that it “developed and
followed a concrete plan to minimize the delay occasioned by such complexity.” Jordan, supra
note 1 at para 79; R v Saikaley, 2017 ONCA 374 at paras 41-48. Tird, to discharge its onus
where the remaining delay falls below the presumptive ceiling, the defence must show that it
took “meaningful, sustained steps to expedite the proceedings,” but the case nevertheless took
“markedly longer than it reasonably should have.” Jordan, supra note 1 at para 84.
11. Supra note 6 at paras 36-39. For an example of this process working as intended, see R v
Papasotiriou-Lanteigne, 2017 ONSC 5337.
12. A point to which we return later in this article. For example, the province of Ontario hiring
new Crowns and judges in 2016. Sean Fine, “Ontario to hire more judges, prosecutors to
tackle trial delays,” Te Globe and Mail (1 December 2016), online: <www.theglobeandmail.
com/news/national/ontario-expands-criminal-justice-system-to-meet-supreme-court-trialdeadlines/article33120097> [perma.cc/2SYB-H8UH].
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Te dissent in Jordan, however, held that the majority’s framework “reduces
reasonableness to two numerical ceilings.”13 While itself an over-simplifcation,
this concern has merit.14 In their warranted bid for simplicity, the Jordan majority
incorporated two Morin factors into the Jordan ceilings such that they are no
longer considered on a case-by-case basis: (1) the amount of demonstrable
prejudice sufered to the accused’s liberty, security of the person, and fair trial
interests; and (2) the gravity of the ofence charged. Under Jordan, prejudice is
presumed once the “remaining delay”15 exceeds the relevant ceiling. Similarly, the
seriousness of the charge “cannot be relied upon,” and is relevant only insofar as it
afects the Crown’s election and therefore the applicable ceiling.16 Tis approach
sits in stark contrast to the Morin framework, where case-by-case variations
in prejudice and the seriousness of the ofence often “played a decisive role in
whether delay was unreasonable.”17
Tis development is analytically important because prejudice is a measure
of the personal cost exacted on a given defendant by the alleged Charter
infringement, while the seriousness of the charge which the defendant seeks to
have stayed is a measure of the potential cost exacted on society by the proposed
remedy.18 Cumulatively, the presumption of prejudice and the removal of the
13. Supra note 1 at para 254.
14. See Cody, supra note 6 (intervening provincial Attorneys General requested that the Supreme
Court modify the Jordan framework to allow for more fexibility when deducting delay—a
request which was declined by the unanimous Court).
15. We use “remaining delay” here and throughout the article as a term of art, meaning the fnal
operative delay after defence delay and delay owing to exception circumstances have been
deducted. See Jordan, supra note 1 at para 75; R v Coulter, 2016 ONCA 704 at para 38. Tis
treatment of prejudice is actually a return to Lamer J’s view in Rahey. See Rahey, supra note 4
at para 36. Interestingly, just one year prior in Mills, Justice Lamer was of the view that actual
prejudice was a remedial concern. However, in Rahey, Justice Lamer saw prejudice as relevant
to the determination of whether a remedy “additional to a stay” should follow. See Rahey,
supra note 4 at para 38. Jordan, supra note 1 at para 54.
16. Jordan, supra note 1 at para 81. Under Jordan, “once the ceiling is breached, an absence of
actual prejudice cannot convert an unreasonable delay into a reasonable one” (ibid at para
54). In Jordan’s companion case, R v Williamson, the majority stated that the right to be tried
within a reasonable time “does not admit gradients or reasonableness where the charges are
serious.” R v Williamson, 2016 SCC 28 at para 35.
17. Jordan, supra note 1 at para 96.
18. As discussed below, a stay deprives society of a trial on its merits. Where there is sufcient
evidence to prove an ofence beyond a reasonable doubt, society is deprived of its interests
in the objectives of sentencing, both retributivist and utilitarian. We recognize that there is
also a societal interest, as recognized in Jordan, in having accused person brought to trial in
a timely manner. We address this point below. Te salient point at this stage of the article is
that the balance between the relevant interests fuctuates. Surely society’s interest is not always
in favour of a stay, and the primary factor that cuts against a stay is a serious charge. Jordan,
supra note 1 at paras 2, 21-27, 156, 210-12.
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seriousness of the ofence as a factor in Jordan mean trial judges may no longer
explicitly balance the accused’s interest in a stay against society’s interest in a trial.
Te Jordan framework is also inherently unconcerned with how much the
“remaining delay” exceeds the relevant ceiling, as well as the cause(s) of that
excess (with the sole exception where that excess is caused by the complexity
of the case).19 As long as the delay is operative (i.e., not waived, caused by the
defence, or caused by exceptional circumstances), the Jordan calculus does not
distinguish in kind between more troubling forms of delay—such as delay
caused by abusive state conduct or endemic institutional under-resourcing—
and less troubling delay caused by the inherent time requirements of a criminal
investigation and prosecution. Tis approach also difers from that of the Morin
framework, where periods of delay that were considered inherent to criminal
prosecution were subtracted.20 Te Jordan framework also does not distinguish in
result between cases with thirty months and one day of remaining delay and cases
with substantially more. Both are equally and automatically stayed. Tis third
factor could be called the seriousness of the Charter infringement.
In stark contrast to the Morin framework, the Jordan framework is therefore
indiferent to case-by-case variations in: (1) the efects of the delay on the accused;
(2) the efects of a potential stay on society; and (3) the actual seriousness of the
section 11(b) infringement itself. Consequently, Jordan reconfgures the section
11(b) analysis from an “interest balancing” framework—where individual and
societal interests are weighed diametrically against one another—to an absolutist
one, where the length of the “remaining delay” is dispositive of the analysis
subject to a few exceptions.21 Because Jordan does not permit this interest
balancing under section 11(b), and the automatic stay rule necessarily precludes
any remedial interest balancing, variations in these three factors no longer play
any part in our section 11(b) regime at all.

II. CLEARED DECKS: INTEREST BALANCING AND OTHER
CHARTER VIOLATIONS
A survey of remedial jurisprudence for violations of Charter rights other than section
11(b) demonstrates that analogous factors are frequently considered relevant
19. Jordan, supra note 1 at paras 76-81. Again, we use “remaining delay” here as a term of art
(ibid at para 75). See also Coulter, supra note 15 at para 38.
20. For example, intake periods at the Provincial and Superior Courts, the time required for
pre-trials, and preparation time for trial. R v Nguyen, 2013 ONCA 169 at paras 54, 59;
R v Tran, 2012 ONCA 18 at paras 32, 38-40.
21. Gerwitz, supra note 5; Starr, supra note 5. Te Morin framework was a “balancing”
framework. See Morin, supra note 1 at 787.
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to the determination of an appropriate remedy. Tis process generally follows
the same two-stage paradigm, where the court makes a binary determination
whether a Charter breach has occurred before balancing the relevant individual
and societal interests at the remedial stage. Te removal of these factors from the
section 11(b) analysis in Jordan may, therefore, herald their subsequent use in
crafting an interest balancing remedial framework for unreasonable delay under
section 24(1) of the Charter.22
Both the R v Grant test to exclude evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter
and the R v Babos test to stay charges for abuse of process under section 24(1) weigh
individual and societal interests against one another in the determination of an
appropriate remedy and are therefore interest balancing remedial frameworks.23
Te following table demonstrates that the Grant and Babos frameworks are
constructed from factors directly analogous to those which the Court either
presumed in, or excised from, the section 11(b) framework in Jordan.
TABLE 1: SURVEY OF REMEDIAL JURISPRUDENCE
Remedial Concern
(plain language)
1) How serious is the
Charter infringement?

2) How did the
Charter infringement
afect the defendant?

Section 11(b)
Terminology
(Morin, Jordan)

Section 24(2)
Section 24(1)
Terminology (Grant) Terminology (Babos)

By how much was
the Jordan ceiling
exceeded?
What caused the
excess delay?

Te “seriousness of
the Charter-infringing
state conduct”24

Te “isolated or
systemic and ongoing
nature of the
conduct”25

Demonstrable
prejudice to the
defendant’s liberty,
security of the person,
and/or fair trial
interests26

Te “impact on the
Charter-protected
interests of the
accused”27

“Prejudice to the
accused’s right to a
fair trial”28
“Te circumstances of
the accused”29

22. Justice Lamer identifed demonstrable prejudice as a remedial concern. Justice Lamer stated,
“[A]ctual prejudice is therefore irrelevant when deter mining unreasonable delay. Actual
prejudice will, however, be relevant to a determination of appropriate relief.” Mills, supra note
4 at para 221.
23. R v Grant, 2009 SCC 32 [Grant]; R v Paterson, 2017 SCC 15 [Paterson]; R v McGufe,
2016 ONCA 365 at paras 59-64 [McGufe]; R v Riley, 2018 ONCA 998 at paras 42-43;
R v Babos, 2014 SCC 16 [Babos]; R v Conway, [1989] 1 SCR 1659.
24. Grant, supra note 23 at paras 72-75.
25. Babos, supra note 23 at para 41.
26. Jordan, supra note 1 at paras 153-55; Morin, supra note 1 at 802-03.
27. Grant, supra note 23 at paras 76-78.
28. R v Gowdy, 2016 ONCA 989 at para 59 [Gowdy].
29. Ibid at para 62.
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TABLE 1: SURVEY OF REMEDIAL JURISPRUDENCE

3) How will the
proposed remedy
afect society?

Te gravity of the
ofence(s) charged30
Society’s interest
in deterring delay
causing state
conduct31

“Society’s interest in
an adjudication on
the merits”32

Te “charges faced by
the accused”33
Te “interests of
society in having the
charges determined
on their merits”34
“Prejudice to … the
justice system that
will be manifested,
perpetuated or
aggravated through
the conduct of
the trial, or by its
outcome”35

Te framework for the exclusion of evidence under section 24(1) (as opposed
to section 24(2)) also balances similar factors and largely mirrors the Babos
framework.36 In these other Charter contexts, the court frst determines whether a
Charter infringement has occurred—a binary inquiry in which the Charter right
is ideally defned clearly and objectively—and then balances competing interests

30. Jordan, supra note 1 at para 81. Prior to Jordan, the s 11(b) jurisprudence had long
recognized that “more serious ofences will carry commensurately stronger societal demands
that the accused be brought to trial” (ibid at para 212). See also Askov, supra note 1 at 1226.
31. Whether and how societal interests would weigh in favour of a stay under an interest
balancing remedial framework is an issue discussed further below. Such an approach would
echo the recognition in Jordan that the public “interest is served by promptly bringing those
charged with criminal ofences to trial,” as well as the early Charter debate that ultimately
foreclosed any collective rights dimension to s 11(b). Jordan, supra note 1 at para 2. See also
Mills, supra note 4 at para 189.
32. Grant, supra note 23 at paras 79-86. Tis factor under s 24(2) relies upon s 11(b)
jurisprudence; namely, the recognition in R v Askov that society has a “collective interest in
ensuring that those who transgress the law are brought to trial and dealt with according to
the law” (ibid at para 79) citing Askov, supra note 1 at 1219-20. In Grant, the majority found
that the seriousness of the ofence “has the potential to cut both ways” (ibid at para 84).
33. Babos, supra note 23 at para 41; Gowdy, supra note 28 at para 62.
34. Gowdy, supra note 28 at para 62.
35. Babos, supra note 23 at para 32. Tis factor—as well as the recognition in Grant that the
seriousness of the ofence “has the potential to cut both ways”—recognizes that societal
interests do not always militate against a drastic remedy. Supra note 23 at para 84. See also,
McGufe, supra note 23 at para 60.
36. R v Bjelland, 2009 SCC 38 at paras 18-27 [Bjelland].
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to ensure the ultimate disposition is equitable, responsive, and a function of
judicial discretion.37
Te right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Charter—which the majority
likened to section 11(b) in Jordan—provides a useful case in point because,
like section 11(b), it concerns a temporal limit on how long a state actor has
to implement a defendant’s Charter right.38 In R v Suberu, the Court defned
the informational component of section 10(b) clearly and objectively, holding
that the right to be informed of one’s right to counsel “without delay” means
“immediately upon detention.”39 Similarly, in Jordan, the Court defned the right
to be tried “within a reasonable time” clearly and objectively by establishing
eighteen-month and thirty-month ceilings. Unlike the Jordan ceilings, however,
the absolutism of the “immediately upon detention” rule is subsequently
tempered by the remedial Grant framework, which confers upon the trial judge
discretion not to exclude the evidence at issue when a nuanced balancing of the
relevant interests militates against doing so. Te result is a clear, objective, and
purposive interpretation of the section 10(b) right that does not under-represent
individual or societal interests because those interests are properly considered
remedial.40 Tis example demonstrates the congruity with which this two-stage
paradigm could be adopted for the section 11(b) regime.

III. MUDDIED WATERS: THE PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF THE
AUTOMATIC STAY RULE
Te practical efects arising from the current dearth of interest balancing under
Jordan and Rahey range from plainly obvious to subtly and incrementally
problematic. One efect that rarely fails to escape public consciousness when
serious charges are stayed for unreasonable delay is that the accused may receive a
windfall. Te judicial stay has been called “the ultimate remedy” by the Court.41
37. Vanessa MacDonnell, “R v Sinclair: Balancing Individual Rights and Societal Interests
Outside of Section 1 of the Charter” (2012) 38 Queen’s LJ 137 (arguing against muddying
the Charter’s Legal Rights with internal interest balancing).
38. Supra note 1 at para 86.
39. 2009 SCC 33 at paras 37-42 [emphasis added].
40. Tis point takes on new signifcance when one considers that the rule in Suberu is further
qualifed by another interest balancing framework: the s 1 Oakes test. See R v Oakes, [1986]
1 SCR 103. See also R v Orbanski, 2005 SCC 37 at para 54. Te Supreme Court found that
society’s interest in “reducing the carnage caused by impaired driving” justifes the suspension
of the ‘immediately upon detention’ rule during roadside stops.
41. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Tobiass, [1997] 3 SCR 391 at para 86.
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It is the most drastic remedy available for any Charter violation that is not
“prescribed by law” such that the law itself may be declared of no force or efect
under section 52(1).42 As a result, a stay is normally reserved for the “clearest
of cases” and the Court has found it to be unavailable in cases of serious, even
“reprehensible” state conduct—such as R v Tobiass, where the Crown withheld
“substantial evidence” that supported a murder suspect’s alibi and cast doubt
on the credibility of Crown witnesses, and Babos, where two ofcers colluded
about frearm evidence and the Crown threatened to lay additional charges if
the accused did not plead guilty.43 In light of this high bar, it is difcult not to
conclude that a hypothetical defendant has received a windfall when their case is
stayed, without any further inquiry, because it took thirty months and one day of
operative delay to complete their trial.44
Just as society may be deprived of justice for the guilty, presumptively
innocent accused persons may also be deprived of an acquittal on the merits
of the evidence. In the words of Akhil Amar on its American counterpart, the
automatic stay rule “giv[es] the guilty a windfall and the innocent a brushof.”45
Tese more obvious efects were recognized by the Standing Senate Committee
on Legal and Constitutional Afairs, which described in its post-Jordan report
how a stay both “has the potential to let a murderer walk away from their crime
unpunished” and to “den[y] a chance of public vindication to the victim, the
accused and to Canadian society more broadly.”46
Subtler, more incremental efects fow from the inevitable creep of interest
balancing concerns into the substantive section 11(b) analysis itself. Te point is
best demonstrated with an example. A hypothetical defendant is charged with
murder. Tey are arrested the day of the ofence on the basis of acute public
safety concerns, even though the investigation is at a nascent stage. Teir
phone is seized upon arrest but locked. Tey are released on reasonable bail.
During the course of the prosecution, the defendant, a YouTube sensation,
42. A process which triggers the cardinal interest balancing framework under the Charter: Te s
1 R v Oakes test. Upon fnding that a Charter infringement that has been “prescribed by law,”
the efects of that violation are weighed against that law’s efcacy and the importance of its
societal goal. See Oakes, supra note 40. See also MacDonnell, supra note 37.
43. R v Taillefer; R v Duguay, 2003 SCC 70; Babos, supra note 23 at paras 53-74.
44. Te hypothetical defendant’s case is not “particularly complex” within the meaning of Jordan.
See Jordan, supra note 1 at paras 77-81.
45. Akhil Reed Amar, “Foreword: Sixth Amendment First Principles” (1996) 84
Geo LJ 641 at 652.
46. Senate, Delaying Justice is Denying Justice: An Urgent Need to Address Lengthy Court Delays in
Canada: Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Afairs (June
2017) (Chair: Bob Runciman) at 37 [Senate Report].
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tweets consistently about how their arrest and pending charges have enhanced
their rebellious image and resulted in their fnancial gain.47 Te original trial is
scheduled to begin twenty-four months after the defendant’s arrest. Due to a
confuence of neglect, inadvertence, and technological advancement, the police
do not successfully crack the defendant’s phone until the eve of trial. Te phone
results in reams of new evidence that renders the Crown’s case overwhelming
(but not “particularly complex”). On that basis, the defence successfully seeks an
adjournment. Te second trial dates are scheduled to conclude mere weeks after
the thirty-month mark.
Tough the delay in this hypothetical may be unreasonable, all three interest
balancing factors militate against a stay. Tere is little, if any, demonstrable
prejudice to the defendant’s liberty, security of the person, or fair trial interests.
Society’s interest in a trial on its merits is high due to the gravity of the charge
and the overwhelming strength of the Crown’s case. Te remaining delay only
marginally exceeds the relevant thirty-month ceiling and the trial would have
concluded under the Jordan ceiling but for the fnal six months of delay caused by
state conduct that, while certainly problematic, is not the result of systemic issues
or bad faith. Nevertheless, Jordan and Rahey require the trial judge to stay the
charge entirely. Despite the majority’s optimism that Jordan will increase public
confdence in the administration of justice, Canadians would likely be unsatisfed
with this outcome.48
While entering a stay in this hypothetical would under-represent society’s
interest in a trial on its merits, declining to fnd a violation may perniciously
undermine the section 11(b) rights of the defendant, as well as future defendants.
47. While relatively few accused persons purport to beneft from their criminal charges,
Canadian courts have long recognized that some accused persons ‘welcome’ delay and there
exist “persons who are in fact guilty of their charges [and] content to see their trials delayed
for as long as possible.” Morin, supra note 1 at 811. Jordan, supra note 1 at para 21. See also
Askov, supra note 1 at para 48.
48. For a real-life example of Canadians dissatisfed because a serious charge was stayed without
considering the gravity of the ofence, see R v Picard, 2016 ONSC 7061; “Ottawa judge
stays 1st-degree murder charge over trial delay” CBC (15 November 2016), online: <www.
cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/trial-delay-judge-stays-1st-degree-murder-1.3852486> [perma.
cc/3YV5-8QWZ]; “Parents of Fouad Nayel join protest outside Ottawa courthouse after
murder trial halted” CBC (17 November 2016), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/
ottawa-courthouse-protest-nov-17-1.3855094> [perma.cc/C7VH-GWZL]; Kathleen
Harris, “‘Dire situation’: Senators seek guidance for top court ruling on trial deadlines”
CBC (1 December 2016), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/politics/senate-legal-jordan-trialdelays-1.3877101> [perma.cc/Q5F3-XD2R]. Picard was overturned on appeal in part
because the trial judge underemphasized the weight to be attributed to the seriousness of the
ofence under the transitional exception. See R v Picard, 2017 ONCA 692.
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Te hypothetical trial judge is faced with a dilemma: Either stay a case with a
compelling public interest in a trial on its merits or strain the boundaries of the
Jordan framework to manufacture a few weeks of subtractable delay—likely in
this case by excusing and therefore normalizing the negligent police conduct that
caused the fnal delay.49
Tis phenomenon, referred to as “remedial deterrence,” occurs when the
gravity of a given remedy is pitted against the fnding of a rights violation.50 Because
the most drastic remedy available in the Canadian criminal justice system fows
inexorably from the fnding of a section 11(b) violation, the Court, academics,
and the aforementioned Standing Senate Committee have all acknowledged
that remedial deterrence inevitably, and perhaps understandably, dissuades trial
judges from properly identifying unreasonable delay.51 Te Jordan framework,
by virtue of its more restrictive approach to internal balancing, is more vulnerable
to this tacit creep of interest balancing as trial judges inevitably struggle for the
49. In this case, the trial judge would likely feel pressure to fnd that cracking the phone
constituted an exceptional circumstance.
50. “We should expect that raising the ‘price’ of a constitutional violation by enhancing the
remedy will, all things being equal, result in fewer violations.” See Daryl J Levinson, “Rights
Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration” (1999) 99 Colum L Rev 857 at 889; Starr,
supra note 5 at 695. See also Richard H Fallon, Jr, “Te Linkage between Justiciability and
Remedies and their Connections to Substantive Rights” (2006) 92 Va L Rev 633.
51. For acknowledgement from the Court, see Jordan, supra note 1 at para 35:
Tis after-the-fact review of past delay is understandably frustrating for trial judges, who have
only one remedial tool at their disposal—a stay of proceedings. It is therefore unsurprising that
courts have occasionally strained in applying the Morin framework to avoid a stay.

In the words of Justice La Forest, predicting this eventuality, see Mills, supra note 4 at para
331. Justice La Forest comments, “the adoption of [a stay] as the sole remedy would in my
view have the efect of making the courts seriously hesitate before adopting it in any given
case.” For acknowledgement from academics, see Christopher Sherrin, “Reconsidering the
Charter Remedy for Unreasonable Delay in Criminal Cases” (2016) 20 Can Crim L Rev
263. Sherrin comments, “[w]e sometimes dismiss serious charges unnecessarily and more
often dismiss applications for Charter relief even though the accused has experienced lengthy
delay and sufered prejudice” (ibid at 264). See also, Justice Casey Hill & Jeremy Tatum,
“Re-Chartering an Old Course Rather than Staying Anew in Remedying Unreasonable Delay
under the Charter” (2012), online: <www.crowndefence.ca/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/
Justice-Casey-Hill_Remedying-Unreasonable-Delay1.pdf> at 52-58. Justice Hill
and Tatum note:
Te efect of the remedial deterrence infuence is that delay though recognized to be
unjustifable or excessive or lamentable, and accompanied by prejudice to an accused’s liberty
and security of the person’s interests, too often results in a fnding that the section 11(b)
Charter right has not been violated.
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means to grapple with variations in the facially relevant interests at play. Indeed,
the question must be asked whether a trial judge can—or should—ever disregard
the fact that she is being asked to stay an overwhelming frst-degree murder case
as opposed to a lesser charge.52
In a prospective sense, the real pernicious efects of this interest balancing creep
occur when jurists rely on our hypothetical trial judge’s precedent, normalizing
Charter-infringing state conduct in future cases. Tat societal interests come
to compromise accused persons’ Charter rights themselves rather than merely
countervailing their interest in a particular remedy is but one resulting problem.
Another is that, because trial judges conduct this balancing implicitly, they do
so without any guiding principle or structure, and are left to address facially
relevant interest balancing factors on an ad hoc, implicit, and therefore inevitably
more arbitrary manner.53 Finally, it is questionable whether balancing societal
Ibid at 51. Te Senate Committee indicated that the severity of the mandatory remedy may
dissuade some judges from fnding that there has been a s 11(b) violation. Senate Report,
supra note 46 at 37.
52. Indeed, it has been suggested that legal rights cannot properly be conceived without taking
measure of the remedy that follows from the fnding of the violation of that right. See
Levinson, supra note 50. David Rudovsky comments on Levinson:
For Levinson, the notion of a “pure right” is fction, as remedies ultimately control the
value of any constitutional right. Under this view, when the Court articulates the scope of a
constitutional right, it does so against the backdrop of the remedial feld, and the constitutional
defnition is directly afected by the range of possible remedies.

David Rudovsky, “Running in Place: Te Paradox of Expanding Rights and Restricted
Remedies” [2005] U Ill L Rev 1199 at 1203.
Justice Paciocco has argued that it is “legitimate, predictable and inevitable” that judges
“seek out and use available legal tools” to avoid unfairness resulting from the lack of judicial
discretion resulting from mandatory minimums. David Paciocco, “Te Law of Minimum
Sentences: Judicial Responses and Responsibility” (2015) 19 Can Crim L Rev 173 at 173.
Remedial deterrence raises the obverse query: whether it is desirable for judges to exercise the
same creativity in avoiding outcomes that are unfair to society when constrained by a lack of
remedial fexibility.
53. MacDonnell has written about interest balancing under s 10(b) in R v Sinclair. MacDonnell,
supra note 37 at 161. “Tere is no indication that any principle—not proportionality or
anything else—governs the balancing of interests in any meaningful way. One might infer
that ‘balancing’ means some variant of proportionality, but the case law simply does not
bear this out.” Take, for example, the nebulous way in which Justice Le Dain accepted that
interest balancing would afect the s 11(b) analysis in Rahey, supra note 4 at para 58:
Tere is no doubt, as suggested by La Forest J. and the critics of the American jurisprudence,
that this drastic outcome [a stay] must inevitably infuence the determination whether there
has been an infringement of the right to be tried within a reasonable time. Tis may well ensure
that there are compelling reasons for such a determination, which in my opinion is a good
thing, but it need not, as the result in the present appeal indicates, and must not deter a court
from applying the guarantee of s. 11(b) in a clear case.
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interests is the proper function of the judiciary under legal rights analyses at
all. As Professor Vanessa MacDonnell has compellingly argued, “the Charter’s
substantive guarantees were simply not designed to protect societal interests, and
there are compelling reasons why courts should not disregard the structure of the
Charter by imposing internal limits on those guarantees.”54
In sum, our current regime’s paucity of interest balancing results in a
fundamental tension caused by a lack of judicial discretion and nuance. Tis
tension will persist and propagate until such time as the Court re-introduces
interest balancing factors in a remedial framework for section 11(b) violations.
In efect, the remedy is in the remedy.

IV. THE COURSE DIVERGENT: THE RATIONALE IN RAHEY
AND CORRECTIVE JUSTICE UNDER SECTION 24(1)
With several compelling reasons why an interest balancing remedial framework
ought to exist for section 11(b) violations, it is worth asking why Canadian courts
have yet to fashion one. A historical perspective suggests the rudder has been
locked on a singular course in this regard since 1987. Although appellate courts
have occasionally recognized the “conceptual attractive[ness]” of alternative
remedies (before ultimately concluding they are unavailable), the remedial issue
has not been addressed by the Court since Rahey.55 Indeed, the Court elected
not to address the issue in Morin, despite being invited to do so by the Attorney
General of Canada.56 Terefore, the rationale for the automatic stay rule remains,
at least explicitly, that which Justices Lamer, Wilson and Le Dain articulated in
three concurring decisions in Rahey. It is important for this discussion to note
exactly what the rationale in that decision was—and perhaps more important to
note what it was not.
Put simply, the automatic stay rule in Rahey was premised on the presumption
that the corollary to the right to be tried within a reasonable time is “the right not

54. Ibid at 140.
55. Te alternative remedy argument is “conceptually attractive and ostensibly supported by
recent developments in Charter jurisprudence more generally,” but it is “precluded by the
current state of the law.” R v Pidskalny, 2013 SKCA 74 at para 48; R v CD, 2014 ABCA 333
at paras 41-45.
56. Morin, supra note 1 at 809. Te majority states that “[i]n view of the result at which I have
arrived, it is unnecessary to consider the argument of the Attorney General of Canada
that a stay is not the only remedy available for an infringement of the right protected by
section 11(b).”
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to be tried beyond that time.”57 In efect, the majority held that a trial beyond a
reasonable time would serve only to exacerbate the violation.58 In a telling piece
of obiter dicta, four of the six justices who held this view also believed that a
section 11(b) infringement resulted in a loss of jurisdiction, a view which has
never found majority favour.59 In settling on the automatic stay rule, the Court
relied heavily on the American decision, Barker v Wingo, but was entirely silent
on European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence that had already rejected
that approach.60 Te Court’s reliance on Wingo has since been criticized on a
number of grounds.61 Most signifcantly for the purposes of this article, the
United States Constitution does not contain a remedial provision, let alone one
with the fexibility prescribed by section 24(1) of the Charter, which afords a
court of competent jurisdiction the discretion to grant “such remedy as the court
considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.” We will return to this point
momentarily, but it is useful frst to address two points which, while some may
argue they have implicitly come to form part of the rationale for the automatic
stay rule, have not been articulated as such.
First, the automatic stay rule was not founded on the premise that only the
gravity of a stay would motivate societal actors to care about delay. Te threat
of numerous stays, such a rationale would posit, is necessary for the judiciary
to ensure sufcient resources are allocated to the criminal justice system and
catalyze societal and administrative reform. Notionally at least, by wielding this
57. Rahey, supra note 4 at para 61, Lamer J, Dickson CJC concurring. Per Justice Wilson and
Justice Etsey concurring:
[I]n my view, what the court cannot do is fnd that his right has been violated, i.e., that the
reasonable time has already expired, and still press him on to trial, for to do so is to deprive
him of his right under section 11(b) in the pretext of granting him a remedy for its violation
(ibid at para 56).

For his criticism of this rationale, see Sherrin, supra note 52 at 264.
58. Sherrin, supra note 51 at 271.
59. Rahey, supra note 4 at paras 48-65. Justice Le Dain, with Justice Beets concurring,
advanced what would ultimately become the position of the Court: “I do not fnd it
necessary, in support of this conclusion, to characterize such an infringement as going to
the jurisdiction to try an accused, although such a characterization may well be justifed for
other purposes.”
60. 407 US 514 (1972). Hill & Tatum, supra note 51 at 60, citing Eckle v Germany, [1982]
ECHR 4 (Germany) [Eckle]. Hill and Tatum consider demonstrable prejudice as relevant not
to whether the delay was unreasonable, but whether a sentence reduction was appropriate.
Hill and Tatum also consider Corigliano v Italy, fnding a declaration of a breach and costs
the appropriate remedy. [1982] ECHR 10.
61. Hill & Tatum, supra note 51 at 35.
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mobilizing power, Canadian courts are able to safeguard not only the rights of
accused persons but also society’s collective interest in trying criminal matters
expeditiously—whether society likes it at the time or not. Tis dual conception
of society’s interest as simultaneously militating in favour of and against a stay
would echo the Court’s ruling in Grant that society may have a greater interest in
excluding evidence where the charges are serious.62 It would also accord with the
Jordan majority’s increased focus on the collective interests triggered by section
11(b).63 Te concurring decisions in Rahey, however, were predicated on an
individual rather than collective rights conception of section 11(b).64 Terefore,
if the automatic stay rule has developed a collective rights dimension, it has done
so implicitly.
Recognizing as much, however, may be problematic for a number of other
reasons. First, those who often presume to speak most vociferously on behalf
of Canadian society when it comes to issues of criminal justice may very well
disagree that society’s interest in motivating expeditious justice in a prospective
sense outweighs its interest in trying a given case on its merits, particularly when
the allegations are shocking. Such candour may, therefore, prove invidious.65
A related issue is that recognizing a collective rights dimension to the
automatic stay rule may call into question the propriety of the judiciary,
as opposed to Parliament, as the head of power to impose a blanket rule on
62. See Grant, supra note 24 at para 84. See also, McGufe, supra note 24 at para 60.
63. Supra note 1 at paras 19-28.
64. Justice Lamer was silent on the issue in Rahey but was explicit in his reliance on his reasons
in Mills, with which the two concurring decisions ostensibly agreed on this point. See Mills,
supra note 4 at para 20. Justice Lamer explicitly rejected the proposition that s 11(b) had a
collective rights dimension:
Section 11(b) enunciates an individual right … this right is, in its nature, an individual right
and has no collective rights dimension. While society may well have an interest in the prompt
and efective prosecution of criminal cases, that interest fnds no expression in section 11(b),
though evidently, incidental satisfaction … the societal beneft … though of great importance,
is a by-product of the section; it is not its object (ibid at para 140).

Rahey precedes the Court’s recognition that society has a “collective interest in ensuring that
those who transgress the law are brought to trial and dealt with according to the law.” See
Askov, supra note 1 at para 76.
65. For a discussion as to whether judges should moderate their decisions to avoid publicly
contentious decisions, see Alexander Bickel, Te Least Dangerous Branch: Te Supreme Court
at the Bar of Politics, 2nd ed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986); Cass R Sunstein, “If
People Would be Outraged by Teir Rulings, Should Judges Care?” (2007) 60 Stan L Rev
155; Andrew B Coan, “Well, Should Tey? A Response to If People Would Be Outraged by
Teir Rulings, Should Judges Care?” (2007) 60 Stan L Rev 213.
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behalf of Canadians’ collective interests. To date, the automatic stay rule has
been premised on the judiciary’s traditional role as the guardian of individual
Charter rights. Purporting to speak on behalf of societal interests in all cases
is quite another claim. While it is common for Canadian courts to weigh
societal interests against those of the individual, that determination usually
occurs as outlined above: Explicitly, on a case-by-case basis, and pursuant to
a predetermined framework. By foregoing a remedial analysis in favour of the
automatic stay rule, there is necessarily no mechanism for jurists to determine
whether society’s interest in motivating expeditious justice actually outweighs its
interest in a trial on the merits in any given case—a task which they are no doubt
properly situated to undertake. What remains is something akin to a judicial
statute of limitations. Indeed, subsequent to the Supreme Court of the United
States’ decision in Wingo, Congress enacted the Speedy Trial Act, which largely
subsumed the sixth amendment analogue to section 11(b) as it pertains to federal
prosecutions.66 By and large, the individual states followed suit.67
Te rationale for the automatic stay rule in Rahey also was not predicated on
a determination that a stay is the only remedy capable of correcting the prejudice
sufered by the accused. In fact, the concurring majority decisions – consumed
with American precedent, the jurisdictional question, and rudimentary questions
including whether real prejudice ought to inform the analysis at all, the concurring
majority decisions largely failed to ask what remedies were capable of correcting
prejudice to the individual interests it recognized as being protected by section
11(b)—adopting instead the rationale that a trial after unreasonable delay will
simply cause more unreasonable delay. Te problem with this simplistic rationale,
as Professor Christopher Sherrin has succinctly put it, is that it “incorrectly
assumes that the problem is delay in and of itself when the problem is actually the
efects of delay on constitutionally protected interests.”68 In the words of Akhil
Amar, “each legal interest has a unique size and shape, and its own uniquely apt
remedy package. Remedies should ft rights, and if rights (or “legal interests”) do
not come in a one-size-fts-all package, neither should remedies.”69 As discussed

66. 18 USC § 3161 (1974).
67. For a compendium of such legislation in place shortly thereafter, in 1978, see e.g. Burke
O’Hara Fort et al, Speedy Trial: A Selected Bibliography and Comparative Analysis of State
Speedy Trial Provisions (Washington, DC: Midwest Research Institute for National Institute
of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice & Law Enforcement Assistance Administration &
United States Department of Justice, 1978).
68. Sherrin, supra note 51 at 264.
69. Amar, supra note 45 at 650.
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below, there exists a plethora of alternative remedies capable of substantially
correcting or mitigating the efects of delay in any given case.70
Arguably, this “corrective justice” approach, which, in the Legal Rights
context, aims to “make-whole” the victim of constitutional violation by returning
him or her to the position he or she occupied before the violation—should
underpin all section 24(1) remedies.71 Interestingly, the Court initially adopted
a burgeoning corrective justice approach to section 11(b) violations before
reversing course in Rahey. In R v Mills, the Court held that a stay was not the
only available remedy for unreasonable delay:
No court may say, for example, that a stay of proceedings will always be appropriate
in a given type of case. Although there will be cases where a trial judge may well
conclude that a stay would be the appropriate remedy, the circumstances will be
infnitely variable from case to case and the remedy will vary with the circumstances.72

Te concurring decisions in Rahey did not comment on this reversal. On its
face, however, the ruling in Mills is more congruent with the plainly capacious
language of section 24(1), to “obtain such remedy as the court considers
appropriate and just in the circumstances.”
Over the past thirty years, the Court has shown a clear preference—in all
facets of section 24(1) jurisprudence other than its application following section
11(b)—for the fexible corrective approach prescribed in Mills over the narrow
remedial view of Rahey.73 Examples abound. In R v Bellusci, the Court held
that an efective remedy under section 24(1) should “vindicate the rights of the
claimant, be fair to the party against whom it is ordered, and consider all other

70. Sherrin, supra note 51. See also Anthony Amsterdam, “Speedy Criminal Trial: Rights and
Remedies” (1975) 27 Stan L Rev 525 at 534-35.
71. Kent Roach, “Te Limits of Corrective Justice and the Potential of Equity in Constitutional
Remedies” (1991) 33 Ariz L Rev 859 at 867-69.
72. Supra note 4 at para 23. Justice McIntyre wrote for three of seven justices. Justice La Forest
concurred on this point.
73. See e.g. R v Donnelly, 2016 ONCA 988 at para 146 (stating that “[i]t is difcult to
imagine language which could equip a court with a wider and less fettered discretion”);
Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), 2003 SCC 62 at paras 41, 52-56
(holding that remedies under s 24(1) of the Charter are fexible and contextual); Bjelland,
supra note 36 at para 18 (holding that s 24(1) remedies “address the most varied situations.
Diferent considerations may come into play in the search for a proper balance between
competing interests.”). See also Quebec v Jodoin, 2017 SCC 26 at para 25 [Jodoin]; Paterson,
supra note 23 at para 98. Justice Moldaver suggested in dissent that s 24(1) could provide an
alternative remedy—a sentence reduction—even in exclusion of evidence cases.
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relevant circumstances.”74 Similarly, in R v 974649 Ontario Inc, the Court held
that section 24(1) “appears to confer the widest possible discretion on a court to
craft remedies for violations of Charter rights” and “[t]his broad remedial mandate
for section 24(1) should not be frustrated by a ‘[n]arrow and technical’ reading of
the provision.”75 It is difcult to square these pronouncements with the narrow
interpretation of section 24(1) as it pertains to unreasonable delay in Rahey.
One possible explanation is that the proverbial tail more or less wagged
the dog during the evolution of the section 11(b) jurisprudence. It is worth
remembering that the automatic stay rule predates the Morin framework itself.
By the time the Court decided Morin, it had clearly recognized the need for an
interest balancing approach to unreasonable delay; however, having precluded
any such balancing under a remedial framework fve years earlier in Rahey, the
Court was unprepared to revisit the automatic stay rule.76 Instead, the Court
chose to adopt the American approach and balance individual and societal
interests under the section 11(b) framework itself—a decision which appears to
have bifurcated the evolution of our section 11(b) regime from that of the other
“Legal Rights.”77 Although Jordan has now properly overturned the inclusion of
remedial factors under section 11(b) in Morin, the automatic stay rule persists as
an unfortunate vestigial remnant of this bifurcation.
Interestingly, Justice La Forest correctly predicted this evolution in his
dissent in Rahey, holding that the automatic stay rule would “give the right
in section 11(b) a pre-eminence over other Charter rights.”78 While Canadian
courts have developed nuanced remedial frameworks for other Charter rights in
the interim, the automatic stay rule has now persisted for thirty years, despite

74. R v Bellusci, 2012 SCC 44 at para 18, citing Bjelland, supra note 36 at para 42; Hill &
Tatum, supra note 51 at 52-58.
75. R v 974649 Ontario Inc, 2001 SCC 81 at para 18, recently cited with approval in
Jodoin, supra note 74.
76. Morin, supra note 1 at 808. For how the Court decided Rahey before a s 11(b) framework
existed and “before the [trial within a reasonable time] issue became a controversial one, see
Janine Benedet et al, “30th Anniversary of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Te
Impact on Criminal Justice” (2012) 91 CR (6th) 71. See also Hill, supra note 51 at 42-46.
For pre-Rahey criticism of the American equivalent of the automatic stay rule, see Anthony
Amsterdam, “Speedy Criminal Trial: Rights and Remedies” (1975) 27 Stan L Rev 525.
77. “Legal Rights” are the heading for sections 7 to 14 of the Charter. Hill, supra note 51.
78. Mills, supra note 4 at 973 cited in Rahey, supra note 4 at para 109.
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federal opposition, academic and juristic criticism, and international rejection.79
In this regard, the Court’s decisions in Rahey and Morin are inextricable and,
by overturning Morin, the majority decision in Jordan suggests Rahey may be
obsolete. If this is the case, a return to the corrective principles in Mills is the
next logical step.
In this regard, although the Court did not address the remedial question in
Jordan, the majority decision augurs well for the possibility of remedial reform.
Te Court’s recognition that trial judges are “understandably frustrat[ed]”
addressing delay retroactively with “only one remedial tool” is signifcant.80 In the
wake of this obiter dicta, the Standing Senate Committee has recommended that
the Attorney General of Canada refer the constitutionality of two alternative
remedies—sentence reductions and cost orders—to the Court.81 Beyond these
portents, however, this article has hopefully demonstrated that the particular
construction of the Jordan framework itself is conducive to the development of a
remedial framework, diferentiating the approach advocated in this article from
its predecessors.

79. For federal opposition, see Morin, supra note 1 at 809. For academic criticism, see Sherrin,
supra note 51. Sherrin argues:
Te reason why the Supreme Court decided that a stay of proceedings had to follow a fnding
of unreasonable delay was the belief that anything less would only exacerbate the problem
by permitting even more delay. Tis argument has superfcial appeal but ultimately collapses
on closer scrutiny. It incorrectly assumes that the problem is delay in and of itself, when the
problem is actually the efects of delay on constitutionally protected interests. If it is possible to
eliminate or sufciently reduce those efects, as well as adequately compensate for them, then
additional delay does not make a bad situation worse (ibid at 264).

For Juristic, see Rahey, supra 4 at paras 59-75. For international opposition, see Senate Report,
supra note 46 at 39.
80. Jordan, supra note 1 at para 35.
81. Senate Report, supra note 46 at 40. Despite having the beneft of the testimony of Professor
Christopher Sherrin, the Standing Senate Committee only suggested sentencing and costs as
potential remedies for unreasonable delay.
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TABLE 2: DISCURSIVELY SITUATING THIS PAPER
Non-interest balancing s
11(b) framework
(adopted in Jordan, supra
note 1)

Interest balancing s 11(b)
framework
(adopted in Morin, supra
note 1)

No remedial framework (the
automatic stay rule)

Our current regime

Our former regime

Alternative remedial
framework

Te approach recommended
by this paper

Pre-Jordan alternative remedy
proposals (Hill & Tatum,
supra note 51; Sherrin, supra
note 51)

V. THE COURSE CORRECTED: CONSTRUCTING A REMEDIAL
FRAMEWORK FOR UNREASONABLE DELAY
Adopting this corrective approach, the appropriate remedy in a given case would
be a function of the specifc form of prejudice sufered. Section 11(b) violations
that cause demonstrable but reparable prejudice to the accused’s fair trial interest
may, for example, be remedied with evidentiary rulings at trial.82 If a defence
witness has become unavailable, the prejudice could be repaired or mitigated
by adducing an out of court statement for the truth of its contents.83 In the
wake of Jordan, a Standing Senate Committee has also suggested that costs might
be awarded to compensate the accused for additional expenses in establishing
evidence that has been lost due to unreasonable delay.84 If a Crown expert report
has been prepared after the Jordan ceiling has been exceeded, it could be excluded.
Tese evidentiary remedies are far more practicable post-Jordan because it is now
clear precisely when a section 11(b) infringement crystalized.85 Such a regime
may have been unworkable under Morin when the point in time at which the
delay became unreasonable was paradoxically afected by demonstrable prejudice
caused by that delay.

82.
83.
84.
85.

Sherrin, supra note 51 at 273-79.
Ibid at 275.
Senate Report, supra note 46 at 38.
While inferred prejudice is included in the Jordan ceilings, actual prejudice would only be
relevant to the determination of an appropriate remedy. Jordan, supra note 1 at para 54. Te
European Court of Human Rights adopted the latter approach. See Eckle, supra note 61. Tis
approach would also accord with much of the pre-Morin jurisprudence. See Mills, supra note
4 at paras 166-68; Hill, supra note 51 at 38; Askov, supra note 1 at para 68.
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In cases where unreasonable delay infringes the Applicant’s liberty and
security of the person interests to a degree short of that warranting a stay, the trial
judge could release the defendant from custody, relax their bail conditions, award
costs, give enhanced credit for pre-trial custody, declare that the defendant’s
Charter rights have been violated, and/or reduce the defendant’s sentence.86 Te
most tangible remedy for a defendant who is ultimately convicted would likely be
a sentence reduction or enhanced pre-trial credit.87 One or both of these regimes
would have to be squared with any revised remedial scheme given the legislative
restrictions on enhanced credit for pre-trial custody and recent jurisprudence on
the unavailability of sentence reductions below a mandatory minimum.88
Fewer remedies would be available to those who are ultimately acquitted.
However, Professor Sherrin has suggested that costs, pre-trial orders, the
declaration of a Charter violation, the peace of mind inherent in knowing
in advance of trial that a sentence reduction will follow any fnding of guilt,
and (“perversely”) the possibility of an acquittal provide signifcant redress for
those who are ultimately acquitted.89 Another potential remedy—put forward
by the Standing Senate Committee and proposed by the dissenting justices in
Mills and Rahey as the “most obvious remedy for delay”—is an order expediting
the proceedings.90 In order to comply with such an order, the Crown could be
86. Sherrin, supra note 51 at 279-91. Te Supreme Court of Canada has found that sentencing
judges could reduce an ofender’s sentence in compensation for a Charter breach if that
breach related to the circumstances of the ofence or the ofender. See R v Nasogaluak, 2010
SCC 6 [Nasogaluak]. Interestingly, some courts, particularly in British Columbia, have
granted sentence reductions for delay short of a section 11(b) violation pre-Jordan. See:
R v Purchase, 2012 BCSC 208 at paras 164-66; R v Panousis, 2002 ABQB 1109 at para 53;
R v Vroegop, 2012 BCPC 484 at para 28; R v E (KV), 2013 BCCA 521 at para 30.
87. See also Sonja B Starr, “Sentence Reduction as a Remedy for Prosecutorial Misconduct”
(2009) 97 Geo LJ 1509.
88. Truth in Sentencing Act, SC 2009, c 29; R v Summers, 2014 SCC 26. See Nasogaluak, supra
note 89 at paras 63-64: “Te judge must impose sentences respecting statutory minimums
and other provisions which prohibit certain forms of sentence in the case of specifc ofences.”
However, “I do not foreclose, but do not need to address in this case, the possibility that,
in some exceptional cases, sentence reduction outside statutory limits, under s 24(1) of the
Charter, may be the sole efective remedy for some particularly egregious form of misconduct
by state agents in relation to the ofence and to the ofender.” See also R v Donnelly, supra
note 74 at para 160, in which Justice Watt found “the trial judge erred in invoking s 24(1) of
the Charter to impose a sentence outside statutory limits for the ofence of which Donnelly
was convicted.” R v Ferguson, 2008 SCC 6 forecloses the use of constitutional exemptions.
See also Hill & Tatum, supra note 51 at 57.
89. Sherrin, supra note 51 at 279-91.
90. Mills, supra note 4 at para 298; Senate Report, supra note 46 at 38.
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required to re-prioritize cases, curtail witness lists, or proceed on only some of the
charges on a given indictment.
In terms of structure, the best remedial framework for section 11(b) violations
would function as follows. Te court would determine whether the delay in a
given case is reasonable under the Jordan framework. If the delay is unreasonable,
the court would then determine whether a stay ought to be entered with reference
to three factors: (1) the seriousness of the violation; (2) demonstrable prejudice
to the defendant’s liberty, security of the person, and fair trial interests; and (3)
society’s interest in a trial on its merits.
Borrowing from existing section 24(1) jurisprudence, a stay would be
appropriate where a fair trial is no longer possible or, having weighed the
seriousness and impact of the violation against society’s interest in a trial on its
merits, the trial judge fnds it “would be harmful to the integrity of the justice
system” to proceed to trial.91 Whether any alternative remedies are capable of
redressing the specifc prejudice sufered by the defendant would be crucial to
both determinations.92 Stays would likely be less frequent than they are currently,
but more common than under the abuse of process regime due to the long
history of assiduously guarding defendants’ section 11(b) rights and the fact that
prejudice arising from unreasonable delay is irremediable by simply ordering
a new trial.93 In cases where a stay is not entered, the court would redress to
the fullest extent possible the specifc prejudice to each of the defendant’s three
Charter-protected interests through the remedies outlined above. Some remedies
would be implemented before or at trial, such as evidentiary rulings and release

91. Te frst branch would be analogous to the “main category” of the abuse of process regime:
Babos, supra note 23 at para 31; Gowdy, supra note 29 at para 57. While the abuse of process
doctrine may be informative when structuring a remedial framework for s 11(b) violations,
Justice Lamer was careful to distinguish the two in Mills:
Te section is concerned not with abuse of process but with abusive process. Te Crown’s
motives, whatever they may be, do not render a reasonable delay unreasonable nor can they
transform an unreasonable delay into a reasonable lapse of time. Tus, whether the delay is the
result of malice, negligence or inadvertence is of little import, the remedy being in all cases at
least a stay, except, of course, when considering additional remedies, such as damages.

Supra note 4 at para 189. Te second branch would be analogous to the “residual category”
of the abuse of process regime: Babos, supra note 23 at para 35.
92. Gowdy, supra note 29 at para 61.
93. Babos, supra note 23 at paras 46-47. Given the strong language in Jordan, s 11(b) is likely
a right that “strikes at the very heart of the criminal justice system” and would likely be
aforded strong protection. Supra note 1 at paras 1-3.
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orders, while others would be implemented after trial, such as sentence reductions
and cost awards.
What emerges is an interest balancing remedial framework that allows
for alternative remedies. Tis regime would yield a host of ancillary benefts.
For example, as occurs in exclusion of evidence cases, the Crown would
actually concede some section 11(b) violations and confne the application to a
determination of the appropriate remedy. Tis would further enhance Jordan’s
stated goals of clarity and simplicity and mitigate the toll on judicial resources
inherent in implementing a remedial framework.
Such a regime would also enhance public confdence in the administration of
justice. As the Jordan majority noted, “the Canadian public expects their criminal
justice system to bring accused persons to trial expeditiously.”94 However, in the
current absence of any consideration of prejudice, the seriousness of the violation,
or the gravity of the ofence, Canadians may justifably feel concerned that our
current regime is purposefully ignorant of factors that are intuitively relevant
to, if not dispositive of, the issue of delay.95 If the Court is prepared to speak
on behalf of the Canadian public’s expectations, then it should recognize that
Canadians likely do not expect the reductive outcomes foreseeably fowing from
the confuence of its decisions in Jordan and Rahey.96 Indeed, the analogous Grant
test is specifcally crafted to safeguard public confdence in the administration of
justice by virtue of the wording of section 24(2).
An interest balancing remedial framework that allows for alternative
remedies would also allow trial judges to address local and societal issues by
amplifying society’s interest in either a trial on its merits or in disassociating
the administration of justice from abusive or systemic delay-causing conduct.
For example, trial judges would be given the discretion to attach more weight
to systemic institutional delay in their jurisdiction or, as suggested by the
dissent in Jordan, attach less weight to “institutional delay that is attributable to
exceptional and temporary conditions in the justice system” where the state has

94. Jordan, ibid at para 2.
95. Public and political outrage followed news that a frst-degree murder charge had been
stayed in Picard. At least in the eyes of the deceased’s family, the Court of Appeal’s
decision to overturn the trial decision restored some faith in the justice system, though
they remain disillusioned. See Sean Fine, “Couple’s faith in Canadian justice system lost,
despite conviction in son’s murder,” Te Globe and Mail (16 October 2018), online: <www.
theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-couples-faith-in-canadian-justice-system-lost-despiteconviction-in> [perma.cc/T9GQ-36QE].
96. Jordan, supra note 1 at para 2.
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made reasonable eforts to alleviate those conditions.97 Trial judges could give
efect to society’s interest in a trial on its merits not only because the ofence
charged is grave, but because it represents a persistent or pressing societal ill, such
as frearms ofences, sexual ofences involving children, and racially motivated
violence.98 In this way, section 11(b) could be refned from a blunt instrument to
a surgical tool for denouncing and remedying the existing culture of complacency
towards delay without compromising the bright-line defnition of reasonableness
conferred in Jordan.

VI. CONCLUSION
In Jordan, the Court demonstrated that it will not shy away from jurisprudential
reform in its efort to correct the section 11(b) course. Tis intrepid spirit should
persist with a re-evaluation of the automatic stay rule. While the automatic
stay rule has arguably always been misguided, in conjunction with the Jordan
framework, it precludes consideration of individual and societal interests that
are clearly relevant to the issue of delay and requires trial judges to ignore the
actual seriousness of a given infringement. As a result, it stands to undermine
confdence in the administration of justice, the rights of accused persons, and the
Jordan framework itself.
Simultaneously, however, Jordan represents an opportunity. By removing
remedial concerns from the section 11(b) analysis, the Court has laid the
foundation for an interest balancing remedial framework. By recognizing trial
judges’ frustration with the automatic stay rule, it has foreshadowed a return to
the corrective principles of section 24(1). Once Jordan has exacted its sea change
on the administration of justice, both of these developments should be embraced,
and nuance and fexibility should be re-introduced into our section 11(b) regime.
Te Court has only partially corrected the section 11(b) course; it is time to
untether the wheel and re-chart our approach to remedy as well.
A signifcant period of time elapsed from when this paper was frst submitted until
its publication. During that time several decisions were released which would have
merited discussion. Perhaps most important was R v Charley by the Ontario Court

97. Ibid at para 209.
98. See Senate Report, supra note 46 at 39. Te gravity of sexual ofences involving children were
specifcally stressed by the Standing Senate Committee as crucial to maintaining confdence
in the administration of justice.
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of Appeal.99 Paragraphs 106-14 may be seen as pertinent, especially paragraph 107
wherein the court noted, “[i]t is settled law, at least in respect of s. 11(b) breaches that
occur prior to verdict, that a stay of proceedings is the only available remedy… . In his
factum, Crown counsel suggests that Rahey and the subsequent line of authority from
the Supreme Court of Canada has been heavily criticized and is ripe for reconsideration
after Jordan.” 100 At paragraph 27 of Charley it was noted, “[t]he [trial] Crown did
not argue that there were any other remedies available under s. 24(1) of the Charter
for a breach of s. 11(b).” 101

99. [2019] OJ No 4693.
100. Ibid at para 107.
101. Ibid at para 27.

